In the digital age, where information spreads faster than light and lodges itself in the minds of millions without any filter of truth, one witnesses the insidious dismantling of the democratic rule of law through the poison of disinformation. This is not harmless static in the media landscape, nor a minor nuisance, but a deliberate instrument of disruption. Behind every false claim and every misleading narrative lies an agenda: to corrupt trust, fracture social cohesion, and undermine the institutions that uphold society. Information warfare is the modern variant of sabotage: sophisticated, subtle, and often invisible until it is too late. The fact that all of this is facilitated by the technological revolution—which has rendered traditional gatekeepers of information obsolete—means that any malicious actor, from foreign powers to opportunistic mercenaries, can inject their lies into the public sphere. To frame this merely as an ethical media issue is to dangerously underestimate a systemic threat that amounts to an assault on the rule of law itself.
Let there be no illusions: disinformation is not confined to political debate or ideological influence. It directly attacks the economic foundation. Manipulated messages can crash stock markets, trigger bank runs, or sabotage policy decisions. A single carefully planted lie can permanently ruin a company’s reputation and throw millions of consumers into panic. To dismiss this as merely a media-ethical matter is to willfully blind oneself to the legal and economic venom it contains. In a rule-of-law society, public debate must be grounded in facts, not in carefully manufactured smoke screens. Failing to counter disinformation is, in essence, failing to protect the core of the legal order. Lawyers, regulators, and policymakers who hesitate are knowingly facilitating a climate in which manipulation displaces truth. The question is therefore not whether the rule of law must take this phenomenon seriously, but whether it has the courage and will to eradicate this digital poison before it becomes irreversibly embedded in the veins of society.
Disinformation as a Structural Undermining of the Economic Legal Order
Disinformation is not a temporary obstacle in the free flow of information but an advanced method to systematically undermine trust in economic structures. The dissemination of deliberately misleading information can lead to large-scale market disruptions, where investors make decisions based on false data, companies suffer extensive reputational damage, and consumers are manipulated in their choices. This has far-reaching consequences for the stability and predictability of markets—core values on which the economic legal order is founded. The spread of rumors about bankruptcies, mergers, or regulatory changes can destroy billions in market value within minutes and undermine confidence in the functioning of the capitalist model.
Moreover, there is a latent but structural long-term risk: the normalization of disinformation as a strategic business tool erodes the normative frameworks necessary for fair competition and transparency. When companies feel compelled to respond to strategic disinformation with counter-information or image policies based on distorted facts, the distinction between fact and fiction gradually disappears. The economic legal order, driven by principles such as freedom of contract, property protection, and transparent market operations, is thereby undermined by a parallel reality in which perception and framing become more important than legal certainty and objective evidence.
From a legal perspective, this creates a need to recalibrate existing laws and regulations regarding market abuse, misleading advertising, and competition law. Classical instruments of civil liability law and administrative supervision fall short when the source of disinformation lies outside legal reach or when it manifests as part of an anonymous digital infrastructure. This necessitates an interdisciplinary approach in which legal mechanisms are linked to technological detection systems, ethical standards, and international cooperation structures that adequately address the cross-border nature of the problem.
Freedom of Expression versus Manipulative Information Dissemination
A central tension in the legal assessment of disinformation is the clash between, on the one hand, the fundamental right to freedom of expression and, on the other hand, the need to protect public and economic interests against manipulation and deception. In a democratic rule of law, expressing opinions and viewpoints, even when controversial or factually incorrect, is in principle protected by national and international human rights treaties. However, where opinion formation shifts into deliberate manipulation of facts with the intent to destabilize society or undermine trust in institutions, this freedom loses its protected status and leaves room for normative and repressive action.
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) provides an important framework for determining the scope of freedom of expression. The Court explicitly acknowledges that this right may be subject to restrictions if provided by law and necessary in a democratic society, including for the protection of national security, public order, or the rights of others. The dissemination of disinformation that incites hatred, sows panic, or seriously harms economic interests does not fall under the protective scope of Article 10 ECHR and can—subject to strict proportionality requirements—be addressed by criminal, administrative, or civil law instruments.
Nevertheless, such legal intervention requires an extraordinarily subtle balancing act to prevent repressive measures from leading to government interference in public debate or causing a chilling effect on legitimate expression. The boundary between deception and polemics is not always sharply defined; therefore, the legal qualification of information requires a case-by-case approach supported by contextual and substantive analysis. At the same time, it is important that actors who knowingly spread falsehoods with disruptive purposes cannot hide behind a claim to freedom of expression that does not do justice to the actual nature of their conduct.
Criminal, Administrative, and Civil Enforcement Modalities
The fight against disinformation and influence campaigns calls for a layered enforcement strategy in which criminal, administrative, and civil law complement and reinforce each other. Each of these legal areas has unique instruments and objectives that, when well coordinated, enable an effective response to this multidimensional threat. Criminal law offers the possibility to punish the intentional spread of falsehoods with a disruptive character, especially when accompanied by other criminal offenses such as incitement, defamation, libel, or public order offenses.
Within administrative law, supervisory authorities such as the Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM), the Financial Markets Authority (AFM), and the Data Protection Authority (AP) can act against entities engaged in misleading information campaigns. Through administrative fines, injunctions, or binding orders, repression can occur without involving the criminal court. This may also include imposing transparency obligations on digital platforms and social media companies to clarify which algorithms and distribution mechanisms contribute to the spread of questionable or harmful information.
Civil law, finally, offers victims of disinformation—companies, individuals, or social institutions—the possibility to claim damages or demand rectification. The legal basis for this can be found in tort law (Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code), violation of privacy, or protection of reputation. The civil route provides an important supplementary tool when other legal remedies are insufficient or when rapid damage limitation is required. Essential here is that the evidentiary position of the injured parties is not unduly complicated by the complexity of digital communication or the anonymity of perpetrators.
Responsibility of Digital Platforms and Information Gateways
One of the most crucial bottlenecks in combating disinformation is the role and responsibility of digital platforms and so-called “information gateways” — social media, search engines, and content aggregators — which serve as the main channels for information flows. These entities possess unprecedented influence over the dissemination, prioritization, and visibility of information, thus fulfilling a function akin to traditional media without being subject to the same legal obligations or oversight regimes. This makes them both gatekeepers and potential accomplices in the massive spread of manipulative information.
The legal question that arises here is to what extent these platforms are obliged to actively prevent and respond when confronted with evidently harmful or misleading content. The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) represents an important step toward regulation by obliging platforms, among other things, to ensure transparency about their algorithms, notification procedures for illegal content, and periodic risk assessments. Nevertheless, practical enforceability and international harmonization remain problematic, as many of these companies are headquartered outside the jurisdiction of individual member states or operate through complex legal structures.
Besides regulation, self-regulation is also important: codes of conduct, certification, and independent audits can contribute to strengthening the social responsibility of technology companies. However, trust in voluntary compliance must not be naive. The interests of platforms do not always align with those of society; commercial considerations can undermine the willingness to intervene. Therefore, it is essential that legal obligations are clear, binding, and enforceable, and that sanctions effectively deter negligence or refusal to cooperate with anti-disinformation policies.
Early Detection, Forensic Analysis, and Rapid Response Mechanisms
The effectiveness of legal and administrative instruments in combating disinformation hinges on the speed with which such information campaigns are identified, analyzed, and neutralized. Time is a critical factor: disinformation spreads at lightning speed in the digital domain—often faster than the legal infrastructure can respond. Therefore, investment in early detection is essential, supported by technological tools such as artificial intelligence, algorithmic pattern recognition, and forensic data analysis. These instruments make it possible to quickly locate, trace, and interpret suspicious content flows, coordinated accounts, and manipulative dissemination techniques.
However, an integrated response requires more than just technological detection. Legal actors must possess specialized knowledge to interpret and classify these information contexts from a legal standpoint. The development of multidisciplinary task forces—consisting of legal experts, IT specialists, psychologists, and communication professionals—is not a luxury but a necessity in modern information warfare. These teams must be capable of providing a legal assessment of the nature, scope, and intent of detected disinformation within a very short time frame. It is also crucial that rule-of-law-based protocols exist for escalation, evidence collection, international cooperation, and communication with involved parties.
Another important aspect of response mechanisms is the restoration of truth. Legal sanctions alone are insufficient; the public must be actively informed about the misleading nature of the disseminated information. This means that legal tools must be accompanied by clear communication, mandatory rectifications, and—in some cases—blocking of content or accounts, provided that strict proportionality and subsidiarity requirements are met. Without this integrated approach, the law risks lagging behind the facts while the societal damage has already been done.
International Legal Cooperation and Extraterritorial Enforcement
Disinformation campaigns almost always transcend national borders. They are often initiated from abroad, use servers located in multiple jurisdictions, and operate through anonymous or spoofed digital identities. This transnational dimension renders enforcement within a single national legal system fundamentally inadequate. Without structural international legal cooperation, combating cross-border disinformation campaigns becomes essentially a symbolic exercise. The evasion of jurisdiction, exploitation of legal uncertainty, and lack of international consensus on standards and enforcement create a legal safe haven for actors with subversive intentions.
International public law—particularly doctrines of sovereignty, non-intervention, and cyberspace governance—provides only a rudimentary framework for countering digital interference. While certain treaties, such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, offer tools for cooperation, their implementation and enforceability remain dependent on the willingness and capacity of states to act. Furthermore, not all states have an interest in curbing disinformation; some strategically deploy it as an instrument of foreign influence within the context of geopolitical rivalry or ideological destabilization.
To truly gain control over this phenomenon, international law must be enriched with binding normative frameworks in the areas of information integrity and digital sovereignty. This entails, among other things, developing multilateral treaties, strengthening jurisdictional agreements, establishing international courts or arbitration panels specialized in digital security, and streamlining extraterritorial requests for data disclosure and enforcement. Only through such robust structures can a credible and effective legal counteroffensive be organized against actors operating beyond the reach of conventional legal authority.
Disinformation as a Threat to Social Cohesion and National Security
Although disinformation campaigns often begin as seemingly innocuous deviations in the public information supply, they can escalate into profound societal disruptions with serious implications for national security and social cohesion. The strategic use of disinformation is often aimed at creating division, distrust, and polarization within societies. By targeting issues of identity, religious tensions, political fault lines, or institutional distrust, a breeding ground is created for radicalization, social segregation, and institutional erosion. The societal dynamic is distorted to the extent that constructive dialogue and rational decision-making give way to distrust, disorder, and cynicism.
In this light, disinformation must be recognized as a hybrid threat within the security domain—on par with espionage, sabotage, and economic disruption. The erosion of public consensus, the hardening of societal divisions, and the depletion of trust in authority figures can collectively lead to the weakening of the democratic legal order. It is a creeping process in which destabilization often occurs imperceptibly until societal equilibrium is so disrupted that recovery becomes difficult. From this perspective, the legal fight against disinformation is not merely a matter of competition law or consumer protection, but touches the very core of national security and constitutional continuity.
The legal system must therefore position itself as a shield against this form of psychological and social warfare. By legally recognizing disinformation as a security threat, the path is opened to granting broader powers to regulators, intelligence services, and judicial authorities—provided these are accompanied by sufficient legal safeguards and oversight mechanisms. Only through this integrated legal vision can the law truly contribute to preserving social cohesion, political stability, and trust in the constitutional order.
The Need for Legal Resilience in the Digital Age
The complexity and speed at which disinformation manifests in the digital age place unprecedented demands on the flexibility, resilience, and adaptability of the legal system. Legislation designed in the analog era is faltering in a world where information travels the globe in milliseconds, algorithms influence behavior, and truth is increasingly difficult to distinguish from deliberate fiction. The law cannot afford this inertia. Legal resilience therefore requires continuous updating of normative frameworks, strengthening of legal infrastructure, and the development of expertise capable of understanding and addressing these new threats.
This resilience is not only about rapid response but also about analytical depth and precision of intervention. The law must be able to distinguish fact from fiction, interpret intent, and adequately remedy harm—without violating the foundational principles of the democratic rule of law, such as freedom of expression and legal certainty. This calls for a fundamental reconsideration of the role of law in the information order: it must not only correct retroactively but also proactively set norms, offer protection, and anticipate threats.
Lastly, legal resilience is not merely an institutional or procedural challenge—it is also a moral one. In a world where disinformation is weaponized against truth, justice, and trust, it is up to the legal community to stand firm for integrity, transparency, and rationality. Only then can the law continue to fulfill its role as the final bastion of social order and truth in an era increasingly dominated by illusion and manipulation.
