Cross-Border Investigations and Multi-Agency Cooperation

Jurisdiction, Forum Selection and “Case Theory” in Multi-Jurisdictional Matters

The first pillar concerns the identification of relevant connecting factors for jurisdiction and enforcement reach. In cross-border matters, emphasis is often placed on registered office and statutory seat; in practice, however, the place of effective management is frequently at least as significant, particularly where decision-making, compliance governance, and treasury functions are concentrated. Transaction flows, the currency used, and the financial institutions involved often constitute independent jurisdictional triggers, for example through correspondent banking, clearing mechanisms, or the role of globally active banks in payment processing. A granular mapping of these factors—including the location of relevant systems, data centres, sign-off chains, and banking relationships—serves not only to inform forum selection, but also to control disclosure risk and to reduce the likelihood of surprises arising from unanticipated information requests or freezing measures.

A rigorous analysis is then required of the extraterritorial reach of anti-corruption, AML, and sanctions regimes. Such regimes frequently operate on broad connecting factors, ranging from the involvement of foreign subsidiaries to use of the financial system, the presence of particular nationalities within a decision chain, or the impact on regulated markets. The assessment should not be purely doctrinal; it must also be pragmatic, taking into account enforcement intensity, evidentiary standards, the availability of investigative tools, and the extent to which authorities are inclined towards (or resistant to) settlements, monitorships, and undertakings. Jurisdictional prioritisation therefore requires a nuanced weighing of procedural rights, disclosure obligations, privilege risks, the prospect of individual prosecutions, and the extent to which a lead jurisdiction can set the tone for parallel authorities.

In that context, careful delineation between “same conduct” and “distinct conduct” is essential to limit duplicative exposure. In multi-jurisdictional settings, there is a recurrent risk that the same core conduct is pursued or sanctioned under different legal characterisations across multiple systems, resulting in cumulative fines, disgorgement claims, and remedial obligations. A robust “case theory” calls for early alignment between the factual narrative and the legal analysis, including a clear articulation of chains of responsibility within the group—holding entities, subsidiaries, branches, and joint ventures—together with close attention to governance documentation, delegation arrangements, compliance lines, and factual influence. In parallel, scenario planning should address potential criminal, administrative, and civil pathways, including confiscation and asset-tracing routes, while sequencing of engagements with authorities should be designed strategically with self-reporting, whistleblower signals, media exposure, auditor issues, and bank queries in mind as potential triggers.

Multi-Agency Governance: Coordination Between Supervisory and Enforcement Authorities

In matters involving multiple agencies, identifying the relevant authorities is a foundational step that goes beyond simply naming a “supervisor” or an “enforcement body”. In practice, financial supervisors, FIUs, anti-corruption authorities, customs and export control units, as well as sectoral regulators may become involved concurrently or sequentially, each with different powers and different expectations around cooperation. The distinction between information-driven supervision and evidence-driven investigation is determinative for how requests should be understood, answered, and documented. It is equally important to recognise that inter-agency cooperation may be formal, but often develops informally through contact networks, taskforces, and spontaneous information sharing.

An effective governance architecture requires clear delineation between a lead agency and supporting authorities, not least because that allocation directly affects the scope, frequency, and urgency of requests. Alignment on scope and timing should be approached as an instrument to manage operational disruption without undermining the credibility of cooperation. This calls for a realistic understanding of expectations around factual proffers, interviews, bulk productions, and system access, where the level of granularity, the contextualisation of datasets, and the mode of explanation may be as material as the data itself. Uncoordinated or inconsistent responses increase the risk that authorities form divergent views, with escalation as a foreseeable consequence.

Managing “information asymmetry” is, in this setting, a discipline in its own right. Consistent messaging to multiple authorities requires internal control over facts, definitions, materiality thresholds, and terminology, particularly where supervisory questions risk shifting into criminal relevance. Coordination of forensic protocols—chain of custody, imaging standards, audit trails—should be harmonised to avoid disputes regarding evidential integrity and reproducibility. Particular attention is warranted in respect of the interaction between supervisors and prosecutorial authorities, given that a supervisory inquiry may, in certain circumstances, escalate into a criminal investigation, with far-reaching implications for privilege positions, interview strategy, and disclosure obligations. Finally, harmonisation of remedial commitments in a settlement context—such as monitorship, reporting obligations, and undertakings—should be embedded within internal decision-making governance, including board committee oversight, delegated authority, and clear escalation rules, in order to prevent fragmentation and inconsistent commitments.

Information Sharing, Mutual Legal Assistance and Constraints

International information exchange is a structural feature of cross-border investigations, but it operates through different routes, with differing timelines and evidentiary consequences. Formal mutual assistance mechanisms, such as MLATs and letters rogatory, generally provide a higher degree of procedural anchoring, but often entail significant lead times and limited ability to influence prioritisation. The evidentiary value of information obtained through mutual assistance may vary across legal systems, depending on authentication requirements, provenance documentation, and the scope for challenge. In parallel, many jurisdictions allow spontaneous information sharing between authorities, which can significantly accelerate the pace and widen the scope of an inquiry while reducing control over disclosure strategy.

Constraints arising from bank secrecy, secrecy laws, and professional secrecy regimes call for a mitigation strategy that is both legally robust and operationally workable. Structuring can play a role, for example through local review processes, controlled access environments, or counsel-to-counsel protocols designed to limit the dissemination of sensitive information. At the same time, the tension between production obligations and privacy or cross-border transfer restrictions is central: a duty to produce in one jurisdiction may trigger a breach in another. A careful legal-technical translation exercise is therefore required to determine which datasets, metadata, and contextual documents can be shared, on what basis, with which safeguards, and with what logging and audit requirements.

A further point of focus concerns the delineation of “confidential supervisory information” and its implications for internal distribution and external re-use. Authorities frequently impose “use limitations” on information received, restricting onward disclosure, use in other proceedings, or deployment in parallel negotiations. Mishandling these limitations can lead to evidentiary exclusion risks, sanctions for improper acquisition or transfer, and reputational damage through breaches of confidentiality. Mechanisms for controlled disclosure—such as staged productions, clearly defined confidentiality rings, and detailed decision logs—support defensibility. Inconsistencies across jurisdictions are best avoided through an information-synchronisation strategy that keeps definitions, timelines, and source references aligned, thereby reducing the risk that authorities draw divergent conclusions based on different “versions” of the same fact pattern.

Privilege, Professional Secrecy and Cross-Border Privilege Conflicts

Privilege issues are rarely uniform in multi-jurisdictional matters and are often decisive for the ability to conduct an internal investigation effectively without undue exposure. An early inventory of applicable privilege regimes is therefore essential, with explicit attention to the risk of non-recognition in certain jurisdictions and to the distinction between legal advice privilege, litigation privilege, and professional secrecy obligations. The practical consequence is that materials protected in one jurisdiction may be vulnerable to compelled production, onsite review, or seizure elsewhere. This requires an investigation design that addresses cross-border transfer, centralised storage, access rights, and the manner in which work product is created and maintained.

Structuring an internal investigation to maximise privilege protection requires disciplined role delineation. The positioning of in-house counsel, external counsel, accountants, and forensic providers directly affects the classification of documents, interview notes, and memoranda. Mixed-purpose documents—where commercial and legal purposes intertwine—carry heightened contestability, particularly in jurisdictions applying a strict “dominant purpose” test. Careful drafting, appropriate labelling where suitable, and strict need-to-know circulation of key materials are therefore important, including to reduce inadvertent waiver risks through internal distribution or engagement with auditors, banks, or other stakeholders.

Waiver risk is particularly acute in the context of voluntary disclosure to supervisors or productions compelled in one jurisdiction that then travel downstream to other authorities. Common interest and joint defence arrangements may, in appropriate circumstances, assist in preserving protection, but they require clear conditions, constraints, and documentation to reduce the scope for challenge. Privilege review workflows within eDiscovery should be governed by robust procedures, including TAR frameworks, sampling methodologies, quality assurance, escalation pathways for close calls, and consistent logging. Onsite reviews by authorities—especially in raid scenarios—require additional safeguards for privilege assertions, segregation procedures, and, where possible, sealing requests and privilege logs. A crisis protocol for privilege challenges is essential to avoid privilege protection becoming illusory under procedural pressure or operational disruption.

Data Privacy, Data Localisation and International Data Transfers

Data privacy and data localisation operate as a dual constraint in cross-border investigations: they limit what is practically possible in collection, review, and production, and they also shape the credibility and legal defensibility of the overall exercise. A precise mapping of data locations is therefore required, covering cloud regions, on-premises servers, endpoints, and mobile devices, as well as the role of SaaS platforms and collaboration tools. That mapping should not be treated as static; it must take account of replication, backups, disaster recovery environments, and the possibility that data, through routing or synchronisation, is in fact located in multiple jurisdictions. Such analysis is indispensable to avoid a well-intentioned collection step resulting in an unlawful cross-border transfer.

Assessing lawful bases for processing and transfer requires a proportionate and purpose-bound approach, including attention to data minimisation, purpose limitation, retention periods, and internal access restrictions. Where international transfer is necessary, SCCs, intra-group arrangements, and supplementary safeguards should be designed and implemented with care, recognising that not only contractual terms but also practical security measures, access logging, and incident response are determinative. Local blocking statutes and state secrecy rules may require alternative operating models, such as local review, in-jurisdiction mirroring, or controlled access rooms. Such structures should be aligned with authorities’ requirements on formats, hosting, and auditability, without undermining evidential integrity or imposing disproportionate delay.

Minimisation by design should occupy a central place in the investigation architecture. Phased collections, targeted custodian selection, and defensible filtering reduce privacy risk and review burden while creating a clear record capable of supporting proportionality justifications. Anonymisation and pseudonymisation may provide additional mitigation, but they have practical limitations in forensic analysis and linkage exercises, particularly where identity, intent, and communications context are legally material. Parallel obligations—such as data subject rights and litigation holds—must be managed carefully to avoid conflicts between individual rights, statutory retention requirements, and the necessity of evidence preservation. Governance around AI and TAR tools also warrants explicit attention to model risk, explainability, and privacy impact assessments, given that such tools offer efficiency benefits while introducing additional compliance demands.

Forensic fact-finding and eDiscovery in a multi-jurisdictional setting

Forensic fact-finding in a cross-border context rises or falls on defensibility: demonstrable care, proportionality, and reproducibility of the methodology adopted. The central requirement is that the collection strategy is designed from the outset in a manner that enables clear, retrospective explanation of why particular sources were selected, why certain custodians were prioritised, which time periods were scoped in or out, and which filters were applied. In multi-jurisdictional matters, that accountability is tested more sharply, because different authorities may have divergent expectations regarding completeness and depth, while local privacy and secrecy constraints can objectively limit the feasible scope of collection. A consistent decision framework, captured in a method statement and supported by audit trails, therefore constitutes an essential component of the record, not only for external scrutiny but also for internal quality control and escalation decisions.

Standardisation of imaging and processing across borders warrants particular attention, because inconsistencies in tooling, settings, or metadata preservation can later crystallise into disputes over authenticity, chain of custody, and the reliability of derived analyses. A uniform approach to bit-level imaging, hashing, time-zone normalisation, and handling of encrypted containers reduces the risk of discrepancies between datasets secured in different countries. Equally, the review setup must anticipate language- and jurisdiction-specific sensitivities: translations can shift meaning, local terminology may require context, and communication patterns may be culturally inflected. A review protocol that explicitly addresses how ambiguous terms, idiomatic expressions, abbreviations, and dual-language threads are coded supports consistency in issue coding and, ultimately, reporting to multiple authorities.

In many matters, integrating financial datasets with communications evidence forms the evidential centre of gravity, because linkage between intent, decision-making, and payment flows is typically decisive. Bringing together general ledger data, AP/AR data, bank transactions, and trade finance information with email, chat, and collaboration tools enables anomaly detection, for example in relation to vendor master data, split invoicing, unusual journal entries, or atypical access logs. Such analyses require strict data quality controls, clear definitions of “exceptions”, and a transparent pathway from hypothesis generation to verification. Rolling productions and hard deadlines can heighten pressure on quality control; accordingly, a governance model is required in which sampling, second-level review, and escalation rules are structured so that speed does not result in inaccuracy, inconsistency, or inadvertent disclosure of irrelevant or sensitive information.

Third parties, agents, and supply chain as a transnational risk vector

In many cross-border matters, third parties and supply chains operate as the primary transmission route for risk, precisely because operational conduct, commercial pressure, and local practices frequently sit outside direct organisational control. Due diligence on intermediaries with a cross-border footprint requires more than a static check; it demands a dynamic understanding of UBO structures, reputational risk, sanctions exposure, and the third party’s actual role within the commercial chain. Contracts, onboarding documentation, payment arrangements, and communications around deliverables may contain indicators of misalignment between formal terms and operational reality. In high-risk jurisdictions, corruption typologies such as facilitation payments, procurement kickbacks, and “consultancy” constructs merit particular attention, not least because such patterns are often concealed through generic invoices, vague statements of work, and opaque sub-agents.

An effective investigative approach towards third parties depends on contractually robust audit rights and information obligations that are genuinely enforceable. In practice, audit clauses frequently prove narrow, procedurally cumbersome, or constrained by local limitations, complicating swift action. Traceability of payments presents a distinct challenge where offshore accounts, pass-through entities, and split invoicing are involved, particularly where trade-based money laundering risks materialise through document mismatches, routing anomalies, or discrepancies between goods flows and payment timing. The availability of evidence within third-party ecosystems is also uncertain: cloud vendors, logistics service providers, agents, and banking systems apply different retention periods, logging standards, and disclosure conditions. Early evidence preservation—supported by targeted legal hold communications and securing relevant portals and shared drives—is therefore often determinative of the ultimate evidential position.

Beyond evidential and jurisdictional considerations, the tension between commercial continuity and investigation integrity is a recurring theme. With critical suppliers, an overly aggressive approach may cause operational harm, while an overly cautious approach increases the risk that evidence disappears or that inaccurate narratives crystallise. Remediation of third-party governance should therefore be designed as a programme that is both preventive and corrective: onboarding standards, continuous monitoring, escalation on red flags, termination mechanisms, and, where required, re-procurement. At the same time, alignment of the third-party narrative in disclosures is crucial to avoid inconsistencies across authorities, internal stakeholders, and external counterparties. A coherent account of selection, oversight, invoicing, deliverables, and payment rationales reduces the risk that the matter is perceived as fragmented or opportunistic.

Sanctions and export controls: multi-agency dynamics and parallel exposure

Sanctions and export control matters are characterised by the simultaneous involvement of multiple authorities with partially overlapping and partially complementary mandates. Financial supervisors may focus on governance, screening, and control frameworks, while export control agencies emphasise classification, end-use, end-user, and technical assistance, and criminal enforcement bodies concentrate on proof of intent, circumvention, and attribution. These multi-agency dynamics increase the likelihood of parallel exposure, because the same transactions may be characterised as sanctions breaches, export control violations, or AML or fraud issues. An integrated analysis must therefore not only reconstruct the facts but also determine which aspects of the conduct carry the greatest risk under each regime and which elements are most sensitive to escalation, such as transshipment hubs, re-export routes, or complex ownership structures.

Investigating diversion and circumvention typically requires a combination of logistics data, commercial documentation, and payment information. Product classification and technical files are often decisive: dual-use characteristics, software components, technical assistance, and deemed exports can create subtle but legally significant distinctions. Screening governance frequently constitutes the core evidential thread, with false negatives, exception handling, override decisions, and audit trails demonstrating how the control framework operates in practice. Trade finance instruments such as letters of credit, guarantees, and correspondent flows can create additional connecting factors, both in terms of detection and jurisdiction, because banks have supplementary due diligence and reporting obligations and may be the first to identify inconsistencies through bank queries or onboarding reviews.

Contractual clauses and performance obligations warrant separate focus, because sanctions triggers, suspension rights, and force majeure analyses can flow through into civil exposure, claims risk, and supply chain continuity. Voluntary disclosure strategies vary by jurisdiction and affect penalty mitigation, but they also create downstream risks for other authorities that may receive or request information. Remediation alignment must therefore be consistent: enhancements to screening systems, end-use controls, training, and third-party governance must not exist solely on paper, but must be demonstrably implemented and tested. Reputational and market communications represent an additional risk dimension, because sanctions-related allegations can rapidly generate stakeholder questions and may lead to asset-freeze or confiscation initiatives, with immediate operational impact and a requirement for coordinated legal responses across borders.

Cooperation, self-reporting, and settlement architecture

In a multi-agency environment, the assessment of cooperation and self-reporting is rarely binary; it involves a strategic spectrum in which timing, scope, content, and form of engagement materially shape overall exposure. Benefits may include penalty mitigation, controlled narrative formation, and the ability to frame remedial steps; risks include generating admissions that can be reused elsewhere, accelerating parallel investigations, and increasing disclosure pressure from auditors, banks, and market participants. A proffer strategy must therefore be carefully calibrated: factual presentations should be sufficiently substantive to be credible, while boundaries are maintained around causal conclusions, individual attribution, and legal characterisations that may be disadvantageous in other fora. Managing downstream exposure requires tight control over consistency, source referencing, and the level of detail provided to different authorities.

Coordination of document productions and witness access is a recurring pressure point. Authorities may require different formats, deadlines, and levels of explanatory narrative, increasing duplication and internal burden while creating the risk that differences in selection or redactions are construed as inconsistencies. A defensible production process requires uniformity in data lineage, privilege screening, redaction standards, and accompanying explanations that preserve dataset context. Negotiation positioning in a settlement context typically depends on a clear culpability narrative, persuasive evidence of remediation, and measurable compliance uplift metrics. In that regard, it is important that improvement measures are demonstrably embedded in governance, training, monitoring, and testing, so that commitments can be positioned as credible not only prospectively but also by reference to tangible implementation.

Settlement terms should be structured with attention to undertakings, reporting, monitorship, scope limitations, and avoidance of open-ended obligations that may later prove operationally disproportionate. Individual accountability forms a parallel track with its own dynamics: separation of interests, indemnification frameworks, and counsel arrangements require careful alignment to manage conflicts and litigation risk. Considerations around disgorgement and penalty allocation across jurisdictions are often determinative for total financial exposure and for the willingness of authorities to limit duplication. Sequencing of settlements can help mitigate cross-default, licensing issues, and debarment triggers, while disclosures in financial statements and market communications must remain consistent with settlement statements to avoid later misrepresentation claims or regulatory follow-up. Post-settlement governance should, finally, ensure that implementation actually occurs, with independent testing and board-level oversight, so that durable improvement is demonstrable and recurrence risk is credibly reduced.

Operational resilience: crisis management during raids, freeze orders, and public escalation

Operational resilience in a crisis context requires preparation that is both legal and practical, because dawn raids, freeze orders, and public escalation are defined by speed, informational uncertainty, and intense external pressure. A raid manual and reception protocol must be structured so that initial actions—identifying authorities, verifying scope, isolating IT, and triaging privilege—can be executed immediately without improvisation. Real-time coordination with local counsel across multiple countries requires a single command structure that centralises decision-making while respecting local nuances in powers, search rules, and privilege assertions. The absence of such control increases the risk of inconsistent conduct, inadvertent disclosures, and loss of control over evidential material and narrative formation.

Freeze orders and asset restraints typically carry immediate business continuity consequences, affecting payroll, supplier payments, liquidity management, and covenant compliance. A legally driven response must therefore be integrated with treasury, finance, and procurement functions so that exceptions, licences, or carve-outs can be sought in a timely manner and operational disruption can be contained. Communication governance is critical in such situations: a single source of truth, aligned holding statements, and consistent stakeholder alignment reduce the risk of contradictory messaging to employees, the media, auditors, banks, and key counterparties. At the same time, evidence preservation must be secured through immediate legal holds, suspension of deletion, and mobile device management, coupled with clear instructions to employees regarding data preservation and handling of information requests.

Employee management constitutes a distinct risk pillar in crisis scenarios. Interview readiness, non-retaliation safeguards, wellbeing, and preventing uncontrolled internal speculation support stability and the quality of statements and documentation. Board oversight must enable rapid decision-making through extraordinary meetings, delegated authority, and decision logs, so that it can later be demonstrated that choices were made carefully, proportionately, and consistently. Parallel proceedings—civil claims, employment law processes, and regulator engagements—may develop simultaneously and influence one another, making coordination on facts, timing, and disclosures essential. Post-incident remediation should, finally, be approached as a coherent programme focused on control uplift, culture interventions, and assurance as to the sustainability of improvements, with measurable checkpoints and independently tested implementation, so that recovery is not merely visible but also demonstrably robust.